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RESCUING THE UNION GRIEVANCE FROM THE SHOALS OF GARCETTI

Navigating the shoals of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v.
Ceballos . . . has proven to be tricky business.1
I.	INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos 2 significantly
impacted the landscape of public workplace free speech jurisprudence. 3 This is
particularly true for the nation’s millions of unionized public sector workers, such as
its public school teachers, who have collectively bargained to have grievance
procedures available to them for lodging complaints with their employers.4 In 1987,
the Court had announced,
It is well settled that public school teachers . . . do not check their First
Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door when they enter public
employment. Nonetheless, it is also true that a public employer has a distinct
interest in regulating the speech of its employees in order to ensure and
promote the “efficiency of the public services it performs.”5

For more than forty years—from Pickering v. Board of Education6 until Garcetti—
courts balanced these competing interests by analyzing whether the subject matter of
the speech addressed a “matter of public concern.” While the Court in Pickering made
reference to the public employee/private citizen distinction, it was not a dispositive
focus of that holding or of the cases that followed.7 By contrast, the phrase “matter of
public concern” appears in each of the three substantive sections, Parts II through IV,
of the Pickering decision. Thus the focus of the decision was on the public interest
1.

Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2011).

2.

547 U.S. 410 (2006). As discussed below, the Supreme Court in Garcetti ruled that public employees do
not enjoy First Amendment free speech protection when speaking pursuant to their official duties and
not as citizens. Id. at 421.

3.

According to WestLaw, as of January 25, 2013, Garcetti had been cited by courts 1875 times in cases
around the country. Of those, it was cited positively in 1773, or 94.5% of the cases; courts declined to
extend it in twelve cases, or 0.6% of the cases. In May 2012, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued its
decision in Schumann v. Dianon Systems, 43 A.3d 111 (Conn. 2012), which extended Garcetti into the
private sector as well.

4.

See Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics
reporting a total of 7.6 million public sector union members in the United States in 2010).

5.

Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Rankin
v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).

6.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).

7.

Id. at 568 (“To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that teachers
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public schools
in which they work, it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior
decisions of this Court.”). In fact, the term “citizen” appears in the Pickering decision only twice, both
times attached to the phrase “commenting upon matters of public concern,” and both in the initial
substantive section (Part II) of the decision. See also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011).
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aspect of the statement, as the Court—in what has come to be called the “Pickering
Test”—balanced “the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting on matters
of public concern” against “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”8 As the Second
Circuit noted in Jackler v. Byrne, however, the Supreme Court in Garcetti “parsed” the
analysis “into separate questions as to (1) whether the subject of the employee’s speech
was a matter of public concern and (2) whether the employee spoke ‘as a citizen’ rather
than solely as an employee.”9
This note explains that in Garcetti, by giving determinative effect to the “as a
citizen” element, the Court introduced a threshold step in the analysis of workplace
speech. Now, before courts may engage in a Pickering analysis10 (i.e., determining
whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern and then
balancing the relevant competing interests)11 courts must first determine whether the
plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen or as a public employee.12 If the court finds
that the employee was speaking as a citizen, it proceeds to examine whether the speech
was on a matter of public concern.13 However, if the court finds that the employee was
speaking as a public employee, the analysis ends and the plaintiff loses summarily.14
8.

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.

9.

658 F.3d at 235. While the Court in Garcetti did not directly specify why it found it necessary to focus on
the “citizen” element, it did suggest a rationale when it instructed that “[r]estricting speech that owes its
existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what that
employer itself has commissioned or created.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006).

10.

Following Pickering, courts considered: (1) whether the employee was speaking on a matter of public
concern; (2) whether the employee’s speech was a motivating factor in the employer’s adverse employment
action; and (3) how to balance the competing interests of the employee’s right to speak on matters of
public interest and concern with the employer’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public service
it performs through its employees.” This test is commonly referred to as the Pickering Balancing Test.
Public Employment Law Press, Essentials of the “Pickering Balancing Test,” N.Y. Pub. Pers. Law (Jan 4.
2010), http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/01/essentials-of-pickering-balancing-test.html
(quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).

11.

“To constitute speech on a matter of public concern, an employee’s expression must ‘be fairly considered
as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Jackler, 658 F.3d at 236
(quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).

12.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. In introducing this “status” consideration, the Court in Garcetti, however,
mischaracterizes the initial Pickering inquiry as concerning the status of the speaker when the speech in
question was made. (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide
interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech. The first requires
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Id.). In fact, there
is no mention in Pickering of such a dispositive consideration of status. Indeed, Pickering was not so
construed until Garcetti. Additionally, courts are divided as to whether this is a question of fact or of
law. Compare Jackler, 658 F.3d at 237 (holding that the determination of “whether the employee spoke
solely as an employee and not as a citizen is also largely a question of law for the court”) with Jackson v.
Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the determination of whether a
plaintiff was speaking pursuant to official duties is a question of fact).

13.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.

14.

Id.

907

RESCUING THE UNION GRIEVANCE FROM THE SHOALS OF GARCETTI

Courts, including the Second Circuit in Weintraub v. Board of Education, have
answered the first question by determining whether the employee’s speech has a
“relevant analogue to citizen speech.”15 In a case of first impression, the Second
Circuit in Weintraub determined that the filing of a workplace grievance in accordance
with the employee’s union contract had no citizen analogue and therefore was an
“official duty” of a New York City public school teacher and not protected by the
First Amendment under Garcetti.16 In Weintraub III, the Second Circuit, expressly
following Garcetti’s analytical bifurcation, asserted that, if it found that Weintraub
either did not speak as a citizen or did not speak on a matter of public concern,
Weintraub would have no First Amendment protection against employer retaliation.17
The court therefore held that “Weintraub, by filing a grievance with his union to
complain about his supervisor’s failure to discipline a child in his classroom, was
speaking pursuant to his official duties and thus not as a citizen.”18
This holding presents a new legal problem: union grievances filed by public
employees are now categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. And
one result of Weintraub III, as Judge Calabresi observed in dissent, is that public
employees now have the incentive to take workplace concerns directly to the public
rather than raising them internally with their employer to avoid generating unnecessary
public alarm.19
15.

See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010); Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241; Spencer v. City
of New York, No. 06 CV 2852(KMW), 2012 WL 2866263 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012); Whitehead v.
City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 0951(ILG)(VVP), 2012 WL 4858989 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012); Fahs
Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Gray, No. 3:10–cv–0129 (GTS/DEP), 2012 WL 6097293 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2012); Matthews v. Lynch, No. 3:07–cv–739 (WWE), 2011 WL 1363783 (D. Conn. Apr. 11, 2011).

16.

Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Weintraub III]. Throughout
this note the following additional abbreviations are used: Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 2d 38
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (Weintraub I); Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 489 F. Supp. 2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(Weintraub II). When referring to the whole group of these cases the generic abbreviation Weintraub is
used.

17.

Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. at 207 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Notably, Justice Stevens makes essentially the same point in his
dissent in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006). For a more in-depth discussion of the public
policy implications of the line of post-Garcetti cases, see Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court
on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick’s Unworkable Employee/
Citizen Speech Partition, 8 J.L. Soc’y 45, 81 (2007) (arguing that if employees “speak only publicly, they
essentially forfeit their ability to stay in their jobs, first because they become pariahs, and second,
because they have refused to use the employer’s internal mechanisms for complaint (mechanisms which,
if used, would eliminate their First Amendment rights)); Raj Chohan, Tenth Circuit Interpretations of
Garcetti: Limits on First Amendment Protections for Whistle-Blowers, 85 Denv. L. Rev. 573, 594 (2008)
(arguing that Garcetti “appears to have created a perverse incentive that encourages government
employees to take their problems first to the media, or any authority outside of the employee’s immediate
chain of command”); Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways: the Impact of
Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 209, 227 (2008) (“As post-Garcetti
cases demonstrate, the Garcetti decision has significant implications for school employees, especially in
the limits it places on reporting troublesome practices in school systems.”); Christine Elzer, Note, The
“Official Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After
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This note argues that Garcetti is inapposite in cases concerning otherwise
protected activity because the public employee/private citizen status distinction
should be irrelevant in instances where: (a) Garcetti would protect the private citizen;
(b) various federal, state and local laws protect the public employee; and (c) the
speech in question addressed a matter of public concern. Specifically, this note posits
that the filing of a union grievance—an otherwise legally protected activity20 —
should not constitute a public employee’s “official duty” for purposes of a First
Amendment analysis of public workplace speech. In so doing, this note endeavors to
rescue the union grievance, a category of speech in which thousands of public
employees engage every year, from the over-broad reach of Garcetti.
Part II of this note brief ly explains the purpose and importance of union
grievances. Part III presents the legal evolution of public workplace speech
jurisprudence under the First Amendment, beginning in 1968 with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pickering and concluding in 2010 with the Second Circuit’s
decision in Weintraub III. Part IV examines the application of Garcetti in the years
since its issuance in 2006, focusing specifically on two discrete, though interconnected,
doctrinal elements: Part IV.A argues that Garcetti’s “citizen analogue” requirement
should be inapplicable in a workplace speech analysis involving union grievance
cases. Part IV.B focuses on the “official duties” analysis employed by the Garcetti
Court and connects that analysis to Weintraub, arguing that the filing of a union
grievance should not constitute an employee’s “official duty” because such conduct is:
(1) a right held by the employee, to be exercised, or not, at that employee’s discretion
and (2) a legally protected activity under federal, state, and local law. Part V briefly
concludes by proposing a new workplace speech test that both incorporates the
relevant considerations of Pickering, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garcetti, and a
district court case from Michigan, Montle v. Westwood Heights School District, 21 and
that excludes Garcetti’s “public citizen” threshold criterion from consideration.
II.	THE PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE OF UNION GRIEVANCES

A. Union Grievances and Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreements

The union grievance is, and has long been, an integral part of the labormanagement relationship in the unionized workplace, and a fundamental component
of collective bargaining—and collective bargaining agreements—because it affords
the employee the opportunity to complain, formally to her employer, about her
workplace conditions through a channel not under the employer’s control. Moreover,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 367 (2007) (arguing that “public employees are better off
ignoring internal grievance procedures and running straight to high government officials or the media
with any complaints they might have”).
20. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
21.

437 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (introducing into the workplace speech analysis a practical
consideration of whether the speech in question actually caused disruption); id. at 656. The Supreme
Court in Garcetti had alluded to this consideration without specifically identifying it. See Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 422–23.
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it allows her to do so free of employer retaliation. The vast majority of union contracts
contain mechanisms, agreed upon by the employer and the union during the
collective bargaining process, for the resolution of employee grievances concerning
the terms and conditions of their work and workplace.22
“Collective bargaining is not confined to the periodic negotiations that lead to a
written contract, but is a day-to-day process in which the grievance procedure plays
a very important role. ‘The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process.’”23 It is the product of negotiations between
the employer and the employee’s authorized labor union and is codified in the parties’
collective bargaining agreement.
The most common union contract grievance procedures define a “grievance” as
any claim of violation, misapplication or misinterpretation of the parties’ collective
bargaining agreement and lay out a multi-stage procedure for its resolution. 24
Typically, this procedure ends with the parties submitting their dispute to binding
arbitration by a neutral third-party arbitrator whose authority is limited to the
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement consistent with the generally
accepted canons of contract interpretation.25 In other words, the employer does not
finally determine whether its own conduct—or that of an employee—violated the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. This method of workplace dispute
resolution has been the part of our national labor relations policy for decades.
A decade after passage of the National Labor Relations Act, 26 the President’s
National Labor-Management Conference of 1945 issued a report to the President
which asserted:
22.

See Elkouri & Elkouri: How Arbitration Works 10 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) (citing
a study by the Bureau of National Affairs, published in 1995, which surveyed 400 contracts and reported
that eighty percent contained provisions for the arbitration of disputes involving interpretation or
application of the contract). One provision reported in the 1995 study is the “Safety & Health” article in
the New York City teachers’ contract at the center of Weintraub, available at http://www.uft.org/files/
contract_pdfs/teachers-contract-2007-2009.pdf.

23.

Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22, at 198 (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574 (1960), one of the cases from the Steelworkers Trilogy in which the Supreme Court
articulated a preference for arbitration over litigation in resolving workplace disputes).

24.

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (holding that public employees are
minimally entitled to “oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story”).

25.

See generally Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22; Labor Arbitration: A Practical Guide for
Advocates (Max Zimny et al. eds., 1990); Robert V. Massey, History of Arbitration and
Grievance Arbitration in the United States, available at http://www.laborstudiesandresearch.
ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013); Mark M. Grossman, The Question of
Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction and Authority (1984). The
scope of an arbitrator’s authority in adjudicating labor disputes arising from collective bargaining
agreements “is confined to interpretation and application” of those agreements, and while the arbitrator
may “look for guidance from many sources,” the award must “draw[] its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement.” Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).

26. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
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Collective bargaining on wages, hours, and working conditions is required by
law. It is approved by the public. It is and must be accepted by employers,
employees, and their representatives in every instance where workers choose
to organize to bargain collectively on questions of wages, hours, and working
conditions. 27

The Conference further recommended:

Collective bargaining agreements should contain provisions that grievances
and disputes involving the interpretation or application of the terms of the
agreement are to be settled without resort to strikes, lock-outs, or other
interruptions to normal operations by an effective grievance procedure with
arbitration as its final step.28

B. Legal Protections Afforded to the Filing of Union Grievances

An employee’s right to file a contract grievance is protected by both state and
federal labor laws. Formalized grievance procedures adopted by employers are
supposed to be more efficient, less expensive, and more amicable than traditional
litigation in judicial forums; they discourage self-help and minimize disruption to
the business operation.29
In the private sector, section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act
provides that “[f]inal adjustment [of employee grievances] by a method agreed upon
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collectivebargaining agreement.” Section 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice—i.e., a
violation of the Act—for an employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce” employees
exercising their rights under the Act. 30 In addition, section 158(a)(4) makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to “discharge or otherwise discriminate” against
an employer for filing charges under the Act.31
In New York, public employees are guaranteed the right to file grievances in the
Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, commonly referred to as the Taylor Law. 32
27.

See Walter Park Stacy, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The President’s National Labor-Management
Conference: Summary and Committee Reports 52 (1946), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
uiug.30112018113362 (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).

28. Id. at 45–46. The Conference went on to recommend specific standards for an effective grievance

procedure. These include: clear statement of the successive steps and methods of presentation and
appeal, design to facilitate expeditious settlement, adequate stated time limits for both presentation of
grievances and rendering of decisions, final appeal heard by impartial arbitrator who would issue
binding decision. Id.

29. Elkouri & Elkouri, supra note 22, at 11.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
31.

Id.

32.

See N.Y. Civ. Serv. §§ 203, 204, 208, 209-a. In addition, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 12-312(d) makes
waiver of alternative tribunals, administrative or judicial, a condition precedent for the invocation of
grievance arbitration. Jerome Lefkowitz, The Legal Framework of Labor Arbitration in the Public Sector, in
Labor Arbitration, supra note 25.
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In addition, New York Labor Law expressly prohibits retaliatory action by employers
against employees who complain about workplace conditions or employer practices.33
III.	FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” and the Supreme
Court has held that “[n]either the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that
this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately
with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”34 Since 1968,
First Amendment workplace free speech jurisprudence has been anchored by
Pickering v. Board of Education.
A. Pickering Establishes the Two-Part Inquiry for Public Employee Speech

In Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher wrote a letter to the editor of a local
newspaper criticizing the way in which the school district’s board of education and
superintendent handled proposals to raise revenue for the school.35 As a consequence
of the letter, the school district terminated Pickering’s employment. 36 Pickering
challenged the termination in state court claiming a violation of the First
Amendment.37 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held that “absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from
public employment.”38
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court employed a two-step inquiry to
determine whether a public employee’s speech is constitutionally protected: the first
step asks whether the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern.39 As noted above, however, the Court focused its first-step analysis on the
33.

N.Y. Lab. § 740 et seq. (McKinney 2011). Specifically, § 740(2) provides, in pertinent part:

An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because
such employee does any of the following: (a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a
supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in
violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial
and specific danger to the public health or safety, or which constitutes health care
fraud; (b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an
investigation, hearing or inquiry into any such violation of a law, rule or regulation by
such employer; or (c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, policy or
practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation.

34. Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
35.

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968).

36. Id.
37.

Id. at 566–68.

38. Id. at 574.
39.

Id. at 569–72. In dicta, the Court made passing reference to the status of the employee, whether as a
private citizen or public employee, at the time the speech was made. This consideration was not dispositive
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“matter of public concern” element and not on the “citizen” element. If it is determined
that the employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the second
step examines whether the government employer had adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from other private citizens.40 In other words, the
second step of the Pickering Test balances the interests of the employee in speaking
out on a public issue against the employer’s interests in the efficient operation of its
public service.41
In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, the Supreme Court
clarified the reach of Pickering, holding that First Amendment protection extends to
private conversations between employees and their employers.42 The Court rejected
the Fifth Circuit’s reading that Pickering stood for the proposition that “private
expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected”43 and held that it
was “unable to agree that private expression of one’s views is beyond constitutional
protection.”44
in this case, however, and the Court did not say how analysis of that status is to be conducted, or what
factors are to be considered, although it did provide some guidance. Specifically, the Court held that
[Pickering’s] statements are in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher. Thus no
question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among
coworkers is presented here. Appellant’s employment relationships with the Board and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of close working
relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary to their proper functioning. Accordingly, to the extent that the
Board’s position here can be taken to suggest that even comments on matters of public
concern that are substantially correct . . . may furnish grounds for dismissal if they are
sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject it.

Id. at 569–70.
40. Id.
41.

Id. at 568; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).

42.

Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979).

43.

Id.

44. Id. In a germane footnote, the Court observed that,

[a]lthough the First Amendment’s protection of government employees extends to private
as well as public expression, striking the Pickering balance in each context may involve
different considerations. When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his
statements that must be assessed to determine whether they “in any way either impeded
the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with
the regular operation of the schools generally.”

Id. at 415 n.4 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572–73). The Court further asserted that

Id.

[p]rivate expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to the
Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate
superior, the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by
the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and place in which
it is delivered.

913

RESCUING THE UNION GRIEVANCE FROM THE SHOALS OF GARCETTI

The Supreme Court further developed this post-Pickering analysis in Connick v.
Myers, where the Court considered whether a questionnaire about employee
confidence in particular superiors addressed a matter of public or private concern.45
The Court, asserting that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record,” found the question addressed only private
concerns, and held that private concerns are unprotected.46
From Pickering until Garcetti, the First Amendment analysis of workplace speech
analysis began with a consideration of the subject matter of the speech by asking
specifically whether it addressed a matter of public concern.47 If it did, the courts
balanced the government’s interest in the smooth, efficient operation of its public
service against the employee’s interest in speaking freely on a public issue. Garcetti
changed all that with its imposition of threshold criterion for protection.
B. Garcetti Introduces Standard for Determining Status of Speaker

Little changed in workplace speech jurisprudence over the two decades after
Connick. Then in 2006, the Supreme Court substantively altered the workplace
speech analysis in Garcetti v. Ceballos. For the first time, the Court focused on the
“citizen” element of Pickering’s “as a citizen on a matter of public concern” analysis,
establishing a dispositive threshold inquiry. In this case, the Court introduced a test
for determining whether the speech was on a matter of public concern that required
inquiry into the status of the speaker at the time the speech was made: whether the
speech was made “pursuant to” the employee’s “official duties.”
In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, an experienced deputy district attorney in the Los
Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, was informed by a defense attorney that
an affidavit used by law enforcement to obtain a search warrant and arrest the
attorney’s client contained inaccuracies, and asked to review the case.48 Ceballos
determined that the affidavit did contain “serious misrepresentations”49 and
communicated these findings to his supervisors. He followed that discussion with a
disposition memorandum, explaining his concerns and recommending dismissal of
the case.50 However, despite Ceballos’s concerns, his supervisors opted to proceed
45.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

46. Id. at 147–48.
47.

The Court in Pickering referred to “[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters
of public importance” as “the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” Pickering,
391 U.S. at 573. Similarly, Justice Souter in his dissent in Garcetti described the “First Amendment
safeguard” as resting on “the value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a public
employee may disclose” because they “‘are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
which they work.’” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 429 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
(1994)).

48. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410, 413–14 (2006).
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 414.
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with the case. Ceballos was then called as a witness for the defense.51 Following his
testimony, Ceballos claimed that “he was subjected to a series of retaliatory
employment actions.”52 Ceballos brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California alleging that the district attorney, Gil Garcetti, and
two of Ceballos’s supervisors violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
retaliating against him for writing his memo.53
The district court found that because Ceballos wrote the memo “pursuant to his
employment duties . . . he was not entitled to First Amendment protection for the
memo’s contents.”54 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that “‘Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected
speech under the First Amendment.’”55 The court of appeals based this conclusion
on an analysis of Pickering and its progeny, as well as its finding that Ceballos’s
memo, “which recited what he thought to be governmental misconduct, was
‘inherently a matter of public concern.’”56 The court of appeals “concluded that
Ceballos’ memo satisfied the public-concern requirement,” and “proceeded to balance
Ceballos’ interest in his speech against his supervisors’ interest in responding to it,”
finding in Ceballos’s favor.57
The Supreme Court reversed, in a five-to-four decision, holding that “when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”58 The Court found
that Ceballos had not spoken as a citizen when he wrote his memo. Instead, “[w]hen
he . . . performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government
employee.”59 The Court concluded that the court of appeals failed to consider
whether Ceballos’s speech was made in his capacity as a private citizen.60 In so doing,
the Court introduced a new threshold inquiry into public workplace speech analyses:
whether the plaintiff was speaking as a private citizen at the time the speech in
question was made.61
51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 415.

53.

Id.

54. Id.
55.

Id. (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004)).

56. Id. at 416; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (“Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to

conclude that if [the speech in question] cannot fairly be characterized as constituting speech on a matter
of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for [the employee’s] discharge.”).

57.

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.

58. Id. at 421.
59.

Id. at 422.

60. Id. at 416.
61.

Id.
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The decision produced three separate dissents. For Justice Stevens, “[t]he notion
that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in
the course of one’s employment is quite wrong.”62 He further noted that in Givhan,
the Court was silent on the question of whether Givhan’s speech was made pursuant
to her job duties, demonstrating, for Justice Stevens, “that the point was immaterial.”63
Justice Souter, who was joined in his dissent by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg,
stated:
[P]rivate and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to
health and safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient
implementation of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on
these matters in the course of their duties should be eligible to claim First
Amendment protection.64

Justice Souter’s analysis emphasizes the balancing of interests between public
employee and government employer, protecting the workplace speech “on a significant
public issue” unless that speech is “too damaging to the government’s capacity to
conduct public business to be justified by any individual or public benefit.”65 Like
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter rejected the status assessment as a dispositive inquiry:
“there is no good reason for categorically discounting a speaker’s interest in
commenting on a matter of public concern just because the government employs
him.”66 Furthermore, Justice Stevens rejected the “official duties” test as unjustified,
noting that “[t]here is no adequate justification for the majority’s line categorically
denying Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”67
Justice Souter also asserted that “only comment on official dishonesty, deliberately
unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can
weigh out in an employee’s favor.”68
Justice Breyer found this list too limiting. He recognized the need to afford
government employers “sufficient discretion to manage their operations,” but found
the majority’s categorical denial of protection to any speech uttered pursuant to the
speaker’s official duties to be “too absolute.”69 Instead, Justice Breyer would return to
the Pickering standard70 and concluded, “[T]he First Amendment sometimes does
authorize judicial actions based upon a government employee’s speech that both (1)
62. Id. at 427.
63. Id. Justice Stevens also points out the perversity of “fashion[ing] a new rule that provides employees

with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors.” Id.

64. Id. at 428.
65.

Id.

66. Id. at 428–29.
67.

Id. at 429.

68. Id. at 435.
69. Id. at 446.
70. Id.
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involves a matter of public concern and also (2) takes place in the course of ordinary
job-related duties.”71
C. Weintraub III Expressly Implicates the Union Grievance

The impact of Garcetti, particularly in its prescription of a new threshold inquiry,
was seen almost immediately in the context of the union grievance. While Garcetti had
arguably provided the theoretical underpinning linking the union grievance to “official
duties,” it was not until Weintraub v. Board of Education that this link was expressly
articulated. Weintraub was a case of first impression regarding whether the filing of a
union contract grievance constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment, and is
thus an important case in the evolving jurisprudence of workplace speech.72
In Weintraub III, the Second Circuit held that a public school teacher’s filing of a
grievance—in accordance with his collective bargaining agreement—regarding the
school administration’s lack of response to a school safety issue that arose in his
classroom did not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.73 In so
holding, the court determined that David Weintraub was acting as a public employee
performing his “official duties” rather than as a private citizen when he filed his
grievance.74 The court justified this conclusion by noting that “Weintraub’s grievance
was ‘pursuant to’ his official duties because it was ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’
about his ability to ‘properly execute his duties’ as a public school teacher—namely, to
maintain classroom discipline, which is an indispensible prerequisite to effective
teaching and classroom learning.”75
But, as discussed in Part IV below, that explains only why the subject of
Weintraub’s grievance touched upon his official duties. It does not elucidate why the
filing of a grievance is itself an official duty of a teacher. Likewise, the court’s
conclusion that “Weintraub spoke pursuant to his job duties . . . [because] the speech
took the form of an employee grievance, for which there is no relevant citizen
analogue” does not answer the fundamental question: Why is the filing of a grievance
an “official duty” of a teacher? The “citizen analogue” rationale leads to the conclusion
that only public employees file grievances76 —it does not reach the necessary
71.

Id. at 449.

72. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 12. In Bivens v. Trent,

591 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2010), decided exactly three weeks earlier, the court found that the union
grievance in question did not address a matter of public concern and so the court never reached the
question of whether it was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.

73. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201. The current version of the New York City teachers’ contract is available at

http://www.uft.org/files/contract_pdfs/teachers-contract-2007-2009_0.pdf. Article XXII contains the
grievance procedure. The germane language therein is the same as it was at all times referred to herein.

74.

The court also alluded to certain public policy rationales for its restrictive interpretation of the First
Amendment. See Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201 (“The Supreme Court’s employee-speech jurisprudence
reflects ‘the common sense realization[s] that government offices could not function if every employment
decision became a constitutional matter.’”) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).

75. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 203.
76. See id.
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conclusion that it is an employee’s “official duty” to file a grievance. In addition, the
court did not define the critical term of its new calculus, “official duties,” as applied
to a public school teacher.
David Weintraub was an untenured fifth-grade teacher in Brooklyn, New York,
when, on November 6, 1998, a student threw a book at Weintraub during class.77
Weintraub immediately sent the student to the assistant principal, Douglas
Goodman, for discipline.78 Goodman promptly returned the student to Weintraub’s
classroom without explanation.79 Upset at Goodman’s refusal to discipline the
student and concerned about safety in his classroom, Weintraub spoke with Goodman
and with his colleagues. 80 Unsatisfied with their response, Weintraub filed a
grievance with his union, the United Federation of Teachers.81 On July 19, 1999, the
superintendent terminated Weintraub’s employment without explanation.82
In July 2000, Weintraub sued the New York City Board of Education, Goodman,
and several others in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
claiming, among other things, retaliatory adverse employment action in violation of
his First Amendment rights based on the grievance filing.83 On April 28, 2006, the
district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to
the First Amendment claim, reasoning, in accordance with Pickering, that the content
of Weintraub’s speech—classroom discipline—related to a matter of public concern84
in part because Weintraub’s primary motivation was a concern for safety rather than
77.

Id. at 198. Such misconduct is labeled “Seriously Disruptive Behavior” by the New York City Department
of Education in its Disciplinary Code and warrants a range of possible disciplinary responses from
admonishment by the teacher to suspension by the superintendent, including reprimand by the assistant
principal and removal from the classroom by the teacher. Furthermore, the Code provides that “[r]emoved
students will be sent to a location within the school where they will be provided with continued educational
services.” N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., Citywide Standards of Intervention and Discipline
Measures: The Discipline Code and Bill of Students Rights and Responsibilities, K-12, at 13
(2012), available at http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F7DA5E8D-C065-44FF-A16F-55F491C0B9E7/0/
DiscCode20122013FINAL.pdf (emphasis added).

78. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 198–99.
79. Id. The next school day, the same student again threw a book at Weintraub, who again sent the student

to Goodman for discipline. Goodman again returned the student to Weintraub’s classroom.

80. Id.
81.

Weintraub I, 423 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).

82. Id. at 46.
83. The district court pointed out that “Weintraub faced increasingly serious charges, which were each

successively determined unfounded, after speaking to Goodman about Goodman’s failure to discipline
the student.” Id. at 52–53.

84. Id. at 51. Weintraub had previously sought judicial review of his termination in state court, claiming

that the termination was retaliation for his having served the board with a notice of claim related to his
1999 arrest. Id. at 48. The court, however, found that Weintraub was “unable to generate any evidence
that his termination was retaliatory.” Id. However, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument
in Weintraub I that the adverse finding in that proceeding collaterally estopped Weintraub from
litigating his claim before the district court. The district court held that “preclusive effect is not given to
the issue litigated in the Article 78 proceeding because the issue that was in question at [that] proceeding
is distinct from the issues presented to this court.” Id.
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personal gain. Therefore, the court held his speech, in the form of the grievance, to
be protected by the First Amendment.85
On May 29, 2007, the defendants moved for reconsideration in light of the
Garcetti decision, which had been issued one year earlier.86 Applying Garcetti’s
“pursuant to official duties” standard, the district court concluded that the First
Amendment did not protect a union grievance because, in filing the grievance,
Weintraub was speaking as an employee “proceeding through official channels to
complain about unsatisfactory working conditions.”87 The district court held that it
was compelled by Garcetti to find that the filing of the grievance is “no longer [a]
viable bas[i]s for a First Amendment retaliation claim.”88 At the same time, the court
acknowledged that the Second Circuit had not yet addressed this issue and that it
might reasonably conclude that “while Weintraub’s act of sending the book-throwing
student to Goodman for discipline was clearly required by his official duties, his
duties as a teacher did not require him to take any further steps such as . . .
commencing a dispute-resolution proceeding.”89
The Second Circuit did not so conclude, however. On November 25, 2008, the
Second Circuit, in a two-to-one decision affirmed that the district court’s decision
that Weintraub’s filing of a grievance was made pursuant to Weintraub’s official
duties and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment.90
IV.	
GARCETTI IN APPLICATION: THE CITIZEN ANALOGUE AND OFFICIAL DUTIES
ANALYSES

Following Weintraub III in 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted in Adams v. New York State Education Department that
“[a]pplying Garcetti, the Second Circuit has declared that ‘speech can be made
“pursuant to” a public employee’s official job duties even though it is not required by,
or included in, the employee’s job description, or in response to a request by the
employer.’”91 This raises two questions about how the First Amendment applies to
the filing of a union grievance by public employees: (1) What determines an
employee’s “official duties”?; and (2) how can the filing of a union grievance constitute
an employee’s “official duty”?

85. Id. at 52.
86. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
87.

Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2010).

88. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
89. Id. at 222.
90. Id. at 206. The court did so expressly by following Garcetti, but without addressing the possibility raised

by the district court. On October 18, 2010, the Supreme Court denied Weintraub’s petition for a writ of
certiorari. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 131 S. Ct. 444 (2010).

91.

Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Weintraub III,
593 F.3d at 203) (emphasis added).
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Where, or at least how, an “official duties” determination fits into the analysis
was left unclear in Garcetti. The Garcetti court did not provide an explicit framework
for determining which expressions should be granted First Amendment protection
and which should not. In his dissent in Weintraub III, Judge Calabresi, distinguishing
Garcetti, noted that “[t]he memo that Ceballos wrote was not merely related to his
job duties, but rather it was the very thing he was paid by the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office to do.”92 The same cannot be said for Weintraub’s grievance
filing. Indeed, as Judge Calabresi pointed out, the Board of Education “did not in
any way depend on Weintraub bringing union grievances or refraining from bringing
them.” 93 On the contrary, Judge Calabresi asserted that he doubts “that most
employers would view union activity as something that their employees do for the
employer’s benefit,” noting the “distinct irony in the idea that unions, which so many
employers seek to exclude from the workplace, are somehow transmuted into entities
that ‘promote the employer’s mission’” when filing grievances.94
In Garcetti, the official duties determination was made pursuant to an assessment
of whether there existed a “citizen analogue” to the form of speech in question. This
led the Supreme Court to a conclusion about the status of the employee at the time
the speech was made: private citizen or public employee.
A. The Form of the Workplace Speech: The Citizen Analogue to a Union Grievance

Although the Pickering Court referenced the private citizen versus public
employee distinction, the genesis of the Garcetti Court’s determination of whether
the speaker was speaking as a private citizen at the time the speech was made is the
Court’s decision in Connick v. Myers. The Garcetti Court expressly observed that
“Connick instructs courts to begin by considering whether the expressions in question
were made by the speaker ‘as a citizen upon matters of public concern.’” 95 The Court
based this conclusion about Connick on its interpretation of a single sentence in
Connick:
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is
not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s
behavior.96

92.

Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 208.

93.

Id.

94. Id. at 209.
95. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 416 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48

(1983)).

96. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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However, the Garcetti Court’s emphasis on the “citizen” piece of that statement is not
supported by the text or context of the Connick decision.97 The Court in Connick
drew that distinction to highlight the nature of the interest at stake—personal versus
public—not the status of the speaker. Indeed, the Court in Connick focused entirely
on whether the speech in question addressed a matter of public concern and did not
inquire into the speaker’s status as a citizen.98
This status determination in Garcetti was made by assessing whether the speaker
was speaking pursuant to his official duties at the time the speech in question was
made.99 This was a dispositive determination for the Court because “[e]mployees
who make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties
retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of
activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”100 However,
“[w]hen a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there
is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees.”101
This “citizen analogue” thus became a determinative indicator of speaker status in
the workplace speech analysis.
But Ceballos’s situation was fundamentally different from that of Pickering,
Givhan, and Weintraub in ways that call for a different legal analysis—one that
considers the form of the speech and, in addition, that does not rely on the existence
of a “citizen analogue” to such speech, as the Court did in Garcetti.102 First, in writing
the memo to his supervisor regarding a case his office was handling, Ceballos was
performing work he was paid to do; in asserting their complaints, the other four
plaintiffs were not.103 Second, in Weintraub’s case the speech took the form of a
union grievance and, when an employee files a grievance, he is not speaking for the
employer; he is speaking for himself to the employer, invoking the rights accorded to
him by his union contract and protected by law for the reasons discussed earlier in
Part II.B. Weintraub’s situation is thus factually distinguishable from Garcetti—

97.

Id. at 147–48. This is notwithstanding the Court’s announcement in Connick that

[a]lthough today the balance is struck for the government, this is no defeat for the First
Amendment. For it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great principles of free
expression if the Amendment’s safeguarding of a public employee’s right, as a citizen, to
participate in discussions concerning public affairs were confused with the attempt to
constitutionalize the employee grievance that we see presented here.

Id. at 154.

98. Id. at 148–50.
99. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
100. Id. at 423.
101. Id. at 424.
102. Id.
103. See Part III infra. The Court in Garcetti implies the importance of this point to its analysis (“Ceballos

wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he . . . was employed to do.”). Garcetti, 547 U.S.
at 421.
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indeed, from all of the aforementioned cases—and therefore calls for a legal analysis
that accounts for the form of the speech but does not require the “citizen analogue.”
Judging from its treatment by the lower courts, this “citizen analogue” rationale
is one of the seemingly less controversial aspects of the Court’s decision in Garcetti.104
But this note argues that this rationale is one of Garcetti’s great red herrings and
should be inapplicable in workplace speech cases involving speech in the form of
union grievances, i.e., those cases where the form of the speech is legally protected by
labor law regardless of its subject. The citizen analogue inquiry is the doctrinal
manifestation in Garcetti of the Court’s new focus on the “citizen” element of
“speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”
The “citizen analogue” as an independent consideration in the analysis took hold
after Garcetti. In Foley v. Town of Randolph, for example, the court focused on the
context of a fireman-employee’s speech complaining about fire department resources,
delivered in uniform at a press conference convened by the fire marshal at the scene
of a fire, though the court conceded “neither of these factors is dispositive.” 105
Ultimately, the court ruled against the employee, finding “no relevant analogue” to
citizen speech to speaking at a press conference.106 But speaking at a press conference
is very different from filing a contract grievance, and not just because Foley was
being paid to speak, but because he was speaking for, not to, his employer, as is the
case with a union grievance. Furthermore, the First Circuit in Foley articulated
something of a bright-line rule when it noted that “the fact that Foley was ostensibly
evaluated on whether he ‘[i]nteracts well with the media’ suggests that speaking to
the press is a duty he ‘actually [was] expected to perform.’”107
Similarly, sixteen months later, in Jackler v. Byrne, the Second Circuit applied the
“citizen analogue” analysis as a determinative factor in a workplace speech case.108 In
Jackler, the court found that the plaintiff, a probationary police officer, had suffered
retaliation for refusing to make false statements concerning a civilian claim of police
brutality against his colleagues. The court agreed with the plaintiff that Garcetti and
Weintraub were not dispositive in precluding First Amendment protection on the
grounds that the citizen analogue requirement was satisfied and because Garcetti and
104. See, e.g., Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 2011); Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d

1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010); Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010); Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333,
1345 (11th Cir. 2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006). But see Weintraub III, 593
F.3d at 206 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The idea that the existence of citizen analogues is a prerequisite
for suit seems contradicted by Garcetti’s statement that the fact that a public employee ‘expressed his
views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not dispositive.’”).

105. Foley, 598 F.3d at 7.
106. Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424).
107. Foley, 598 F.3d at 7.
108. 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying

Garcetti in case of former FBI agent fired for refusing to give false testimony against a colleague). On
February 27, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases. See Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S.
Ct. 1634 (2012); Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
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Weintraub did not preclude First Amendment protection for refusing to speak falsely.109
The court thus distinguished Ceballos’s affirmative speech from Jackler’s affirmative
refusal to speak.110 Consistent with its decision in Weintraub III, the Second Circuit
in Jackler again applied a citizen analogue analysis, reaffirming that Weintraub’s
grievance had “no relevant analogue to citizen speech,”111 but finding that Jackler’s
refusal to speak, in effect, did have an analogue.112
When a public employee possesses information on a matter of public concern, the
public has an interest in disclosure of that information and the status of the speaker,
whether as a public employee or private citizen, when disclosing that information
should not supersede that interest. With regard to union grievances, it should not
matter whether the public has an analogous mechanism for communicating the
information that is the subject of a union grievance filed by a public employee. If the
subject of the speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court should disregard
the fact that the speech is made in the form of a grievance and focus instead on
balancing the public’s right to receive such information with the rights of the public
employer in the efficient operation of the services it provides.
B. The Subject Matter of the Workplace Speech: Pursuant to Official Duties

A linchpin of the “citizen analogue” inquiry is the inscrutable, inchoate concept
of “official duties.” Breaking from the Pickering inquiry, the Supreme Court in
Garcetti announced that speech made “pursuant to” a public employee’s “official
duties” was categorically unprotected by the First Amendment because the employee
was not speaking in his capacity as a citizen.113 In other words, if the speech by a
109. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 234–37.
110. Id. at 232.
111. Id. at 238 (quoting Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010)).
112. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241 (“[A] citizen has a First Amendment right to decide what to say and what not to

say, and, accordingly, the right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make statements he believes
are false.”). Ultimately, the court found Jackler’s refusal to recant his honest testimony and replace it with
false testimony to have a “clear civilian analogue” and that he was “not simply doing his job.” The court
asserted that “it is clear that the First Amendment protects the rights of a citizen to refuse to retract a
report to the police that he believes is true, to refuse to make a statement that he believes is false, and to
refuse to engage in unlawful conduct by filing a false report with the police.” Id. at 241–42.

113. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Court began its analysis with the premise: “When a

citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her
freedom.” Id. at 418. It added a second premise: “Public employees . . . often occupy trusted positions in
society. When they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the
proper performance of governmental functions.” Id. at 418–19. The Court continued its analysis by noting
that “[t]he First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship
to restrict . . . the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” Id. at 419. The Court
concluded that its task is “both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when
employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers
attempting to perform their important public functions.” Id. at 420. Finally, and most apropos to the focus
of this note, the Court asserted that “[u]nderlying our cases has been the premise that while the First
Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to ‘constitutionalize
the employee grievance.’” Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
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public employee is pursuant to her official duties, the court no longer reaches the
question of whether her speech addressed a matter of public concern. This official
duties inquiry reduces the scope of First Amendment protection for public employees.
But by failing to define its two key terms—“pursuant to” and “official duties”—the
Court provided little guidance to the lower courts in administering this new test,114
which has led to conflicting opinions.115
Weintraub is one such example. The Second Circuit in Weintraub III professes to
be following Garcetti, but in doing so the court in fact employs language both
semantically distinct from that in Garcetti and undefined at key points in its decision.
For instance, the Second Circuit’s “in furtherance of core duties” standard in
Weintraub III was not the standard employed by the court in Garcetti.116 “In
furtherance of ” and “pursuant to” are not synonymous.117 In addition, the court does
not define what it means by Weintraub’s “core duties.”118 It also fails to explain
whether “core duties” are synonymous with or distinct from “official duties” (the
Garcetti term) or perhaps are a subset of them. If they are distinct, then the Garcetti
analysis does not apply. While it is unclear whether these semantic differences would
114. To further confuse matters, at others points in the decision the Court claims to be restricting speech

that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis
added).

115. See Lindsey v. Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897–98 (8th Cir. 2007); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 66,

647–48 (7th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Battle v. Bd. of Regents,
468 F.3d 755, 761 (11th Cir. 2006); Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 109–10 (N.D.N.Y. 2007);
Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394–99 (D. Conn. 2006). Compare Gonzales v. City of
Chicago, 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001) with Delgado v. Jones, 95 F. App’x 185 (7th Cir. 2004). See also
Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 262 Educ. L. Rep. 357, 358–59 (2011) (“Most circuits have impermissibly read the
Garcetti rule to impose a much broader exemption that the Court recognized, and that this misapplication
stems from a failure of these lower courts to recognize the restrictive function of the words ‘pursuant to’
in the context of the facts before the Garcetti Court.”); Chohan, supra note 19, at 575 n.26 (“Garcetti is
overly broad, lacks predictability, and leaves too much speech unprotected. . . . Predictably, different
courts have taken different approaches to this analysis.”) (citing Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career
Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (2006)); Elzer, supra note 19, at 367 (“The Court’s failure to articulate an
‘official duties’ test has caused lower courts to interpret Garcetti in many different, and sometimes
conflicting, ways.”).

116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added).
117. “Pursuant to” is defined as “in carrying out; in conformity with; according to.” Pursuant to—Definition

and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://w w w.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
pursuant%20to (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Furtherance” is defined as “the act of furthering;
advancement.” Furtherance—Definition and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/furtherance (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Duty” is defined, in relevant
part, as “obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions that arise from one’s position.” Duty—Definition
and More, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/duty (last
visited Mar. 23, 2013).

118. This particular confusion has arisen in other circuits as well. See, e.g., Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826

(7th Cir. 2008). In Trigillo, the Seventh Circuit announced that “[b]efore Garcetti, we held that speech
consistent with an employee’s general duties, but not part of her ‘core functions,’ deserved constitutional
protection. But Garcetti required us to abandon this proposition.” Id. at 829 (citations omitted).
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lead to a different result, the undefined doctrinal terms have resulted in loose and
inconsistent applications by courts.
In Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, for example, the Tenth
Circuit held that speech made pursuant to “official duties” may “concern[] an unusual
aspect of an employee’s job that is not part of his everyday functions.”119 The court
applied a five-step Garcetti/Pickering analysis,120 and found that some of the teachers’
numerous grievances were not made pursuant to their official duties because, for
example, some of the speech in question “occurred after hours and outside the
Academy[,] . . . [and] the discussions included ordinary citizens . . . who were not
employed by the Academy.”121 “[I]f an employee engages in speech during the course
of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or facilitates
the employee’s performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the
employee’s official duties.”122 By equating “pursuant to” with “reasonably contributes
to” and “facilitates,” the court arguably greatly broadened the scope of the Garcetti
First Amendment protection exclusion.
Furthermore, the Brammer-Hoelter court asserted that “not all speech that occurs
at work is made pursuant to an employee’s official duties. Nor is all speech about the
subject matter of an employee’s work necessarily made pursuant to the employee’s
official duties.”123 Where the teachers lodged their complaints formally with the
school’s board of education pursuant to the board’s policy and direction, the court
found that, since the teachers “were encouraged to present their view to improve the
[school] and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the Board,” the court
“cannot deem such a generalized grievance policy to be an official duty without
119. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Battle v.

Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006)).

120. The court held that:

[f]irst, the court must determine whether the employee speaks “pursuant to [his] official
duties.” If the employee speaks pursuant to his official duties, then there is no
constitutional protection because the restriction on speech “simply reflects the exercise
of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.” Second,
if an employee does not speak pursuant to his official duties, but instead speaks as a
citizen, the court must determine whether the subject of the speech is a matter of public
concern. If the speech is not a matter of public concern, then the speech is unprotected
and the inquiry ends. Third, if the employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, the court must determine “whether the employee’s interest in commenting on
the issue outweighs the interest of the state as employer.” Fourth, assuming the
employee’s interest outweighs that of the employer, the employee must show that his
speech was a “substantial factor or a motivating factor in a detrimental employment
decision.” Finally, if the employee establishes that his speech was such a factor, “the
employer may demonstrate that it would have taken the same action against the
employee even in the absence of the protected speech.”

Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202–03 (citations omitted).

121. Id. at 1205. The court lists twelve grievances, but it is clear from that list that the court focused only on

the subject of those grievances and not at all on the form or forum in which they were communicated.

122. Id. at 1203.
123. Id. at 1204 (citations omitted).
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eviscerating Garcetti and the general constitutional principle that ‘public employees
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.’”124
Moreover, according to the First Circuit in Decotiis, the Brammer-Hoelter court held
“that the teachers’ speech was citizen speech because it occurred after hours and
outside of the workplace, the teachers ‘had no supervisory responsibility and no duty
to report with regard to any of the problems being discussed,’ and the discussion
included members of the public.”125
Most of the same could be said about David Weintraub’s speech. Union
grievances are typically filed after hours and Weintraub owed no duty to his employer
to file the grievance. But that did not seem to influence the decision in Weintraub.
The district court in its first decision, Weintraub I, concluded that the court “is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”126
But the court then concluded that “it is clear that Weintraub’s . . . filing the formal
grievance [is] not protected speech under the Garcetti Court’s interpretation of the
First Amendment.”127 The district court, upon reconsideration following the Garcetti
opinion, in Weintraub II, noted that
the general principle running through [the] cases applying Garcetti to similar
situations is that, when a public employee airs a complaint or grievance, or
expresses concern about misconduct, to his or her immediate supervisor or
pursuant to a clear duty to report imposed by law or employer policy, he or she is
speaking as an employee and not as a citizen.128

However, this does not apply to contract grievances because an employee is never
compelled to file a grievance.129
Additionally, the district court continued that “[i]f, however, the employee goes
outside of the established institutional channels in order to express a complaint or
concern, the employee is speaking as a citizen, and the speech is protected.”130 But

124. Id. at 1204 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006)).
125. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 33 n.12 (1st Cir. 2011).
126. Weintraub I, 423 F. Supp. 2d 38, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,

569 (1968)).

127. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
128. Id (emphasis added). The court here appears to be using the term “grievance” in a colloquial sense as

opposed to the term of art in a labor setting where it refers, as in Weintraub, specifically to a formal part of
a collectively bargained employment dispute resolution procedure. See Deborah A. Schmedemann,
Reconciling Differences: The Theory and Law of Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 Indus. Rel. L.J. 523 (1987).

129. New York State’s Taylor Law, for example, speaks in terms of employee “rights,” not “obligations.”

Specifically, section 203 guarantees public employees “the right to . . . the administration of grievances
arising” under a collective bargaining agreement. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 203 (McKinney 2011).

130. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 219.
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the court does not define what it means by “institutional channels.”131 Regardless, a
collectively bargained grievance procedure, negotiated in accordance with, and
protected by, applicable labor law, is not an “institutional channel.”132 Instead, it is a
dispute resolution mechanism mutually agreed upon by the employer and the
union—an external organization independent from the employer.133 Indeed, although
the lack of a citizen analogue should not preclude First Amendment protection, for a
range of workplace-related disputes, the contract grievance is often the only option
available to an employee to get to an arbiter outside of the workplace.134 In Weintraub,
the district court confuses “institutional channels,” which implies unilateral
employer-created policies and mechanisms associated with the employer organization,
with “official channels,” which more broadly suggests a formally sanctioned
collectively bargained mechanism.135
This confusion is highlighted by the district court’s description of the grievance
procedure as “a formal dispute-resolution process put in place by his employer.”136 In fact,
in the case of Weintraub the grievance procedure is a mandatory subject of bargaining
that was negotiated by the union with the city of New York.137 It would violate New
York’s Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act for a public employer to unilaterally
institute a grievance procedure for unionized employees without negotiation with a
duly certified union.138 The court of appeals picks up on and develops this confusion
131. This omission has created further confusion in the courts. See, e.g., Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Cent. Sch.

Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141–42 (“As several courts in this Circuit have noted, this factor . . . appears
to be interchangeably referred to as the ‘relevant analogue’ or ‘institutional channels’ factor.”).

132. Section 158(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer

“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).

133. “Institutional” suggests some practice or thing associated with or connected to an institution.

Institutional—Definitions and More, Merriam-Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/institutional (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). “Official” suggests a practice or thing formally
sanctioned. Official—Definitions and More, Merriam-Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/official (last visited Mar. 23, 2013). A collective bargaining agreement, including its
grievance provisions, is no more associated with an “institutional” employer than it is with a labor
union, which exists wholly independent of, and external to, the institution for which its members work.

134. See generally 20 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 55:61 (4th ed. 2011) (“The general

rule is that an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of
grievances may not maintain a civil action for damages in the case of an alleged breach of the agreement,
but must instead look to the union for a remedy provided by the contractual grievance procedure.”)
(citations omitted).

135. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 219–20; see also Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 232 (2d Cir. 2011).
136. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (emphasis added).
137. New York State Public Employment Relations Board, Mandatory/Non-mandatory

Subjects of Negotiation 93 (2009) (“Grievance procedures are terms and conditions of employment
and, thus, mandatorily negotiable.”).

138. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 209-a(1)(d) (McKinney 2011) (“It shall be an improper practice for public

employer [sic] or its agents deliberately . . . (d) to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees . . . .”). This is true for all public sector
unions in New York State, in accordance with the Taylor Law.
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in Weintraub III. Its description of a union grievance as an “internal communication”139
is “dubious,” as Judge Calabresi observes in his dissenting opinion.140 As Judge
Calabresi also correctly notes, the United Federation of Teachers is an external body141
and the filing of a contractual grievance is a protected activity under municipal, state,
and federal labor laws.142 Furthermore, grievance procedures do not constitute internal
school policy, are not subject to employer discretion, and are not considered a
management right.143 Therefore, they cannot be considered either institutional or
internal to the place of government employment. If the activity is itself legally
protected against adverse employment consequences, then no retaliatory consequences
should follow the engagement in such activity. Reading the First Amendment as not
protecting the filing of union grievances effectively results in an end-run around those
labor laws and the protections they provide for such activity.
Moreover, Judge Calabresi highlights a critical distinction unaddressed by the
majority, noting that he
take[s] it as a given that Weintraub’s duties entailed informing the school
administration of violent incidents, such as those at the root of this case, as a
means of facilitating the school’s disciplinary apparatus. This justifies the
district court’s holding that Weintraub’s comments to his supervisor were not
protected. But grieving the administration’s response through his union is quite
another matter.144

Indeed, the majority never states why, by filing a grievance, Weintraub was speaking
pursuant to his official duties apart from finding that no citizen analogue existed.
The district court stated that “Weintraub’s conversations with other teachers about
his conflict with Goodman . . . are clearly not within the scope of his employment
duties.”145 The court concluded that, “when speaking to his co-workers about his
concerns regarding school safety and Goodman’s handling of the book-throwing
incidents, Weintraub was speaking as a citizen rather than as an employee.”146 But
the court fails to explain why it considers his conversations with his colleagues as
materially different and distinct from his conversation with Goodman, which it
found to be within the scope of his duties. The only apparent distinction is that
139. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 206 n.2 (2d Cir. 2011).
140. Id. at 206 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. See infra text accompanying note 157.
143. See the New York City teachers’ collective bargaining agreement. Contract, United Federation of

Teachers 2007–2009 (2007), available at http://w w w.uft.org/f iles/contract_pdfs/teacherscontract-2007-2009_0.pdf. Article XXII contains the grievance procedure.

144. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added).
145. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Indeed, it is not at all clear why filing a

grievance about school safety is “clearly” within a teacher’s “official duties” while conferring with
colleagues about school safety is not.

146. Id.
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Weintraub believed that Goodman, his supervisor, could do something about the
problem and that his colleagues could not.
As a matter of public policy, this is problematic because of the disincentive it
creates. Finding its hands tied, the district court concluded:
[t]hough it questions the wisdom of a constitutional policy that disincentivizes
public employees from bringing serious misconduct and abuse to the attention
of their superiors, while perversely encouraging them to take every internal
conf lict to the highest levels of governmental oversight, this [c]ourt must
nevertheless apply the Garcetti rule in good faith until the Supreme Court
sees fit to revisit the issue.147

In summarizing the then-current state of the circuit courts on the question, the
district court observed that “a substantial ground for difference of opinion may exist”
because
while Weintraub’s act of sending the book-throwing student to Goodman for
discipline was clearly required by his official duties, his duties as a teacher did
not require him to take any further steps such as approaching Goodman
about the situation or commencing a dispute-resolution proceeding. The
supererogatory nature of those subsequent actions may prove sufficient to
sustain the view that Weintraub was not acting pursuant to any duty when he
performed those actions, and that his speech was therefore protected.148

This is relevant because, as the court of appeals noted, quoting Garcetti, the “proper
inquiry” into whether Weintraub was acting pursuant to his official duties “is a
practical one.”149 The Court in Garcetti equated such duties with those the “employee
actually is expected to perform.”150 But despite this fundamental recognition of the
distinction between form and subject, the district court found Weintraub’s speech
unprotected.
C.	Conflation of the Form and Subject Matter Analyses in Workplace Speech Cases:
The Union Grievance

A concurrent problem contributing to, and arguably underpinning, the uniongrievance-as-official-duties canard is the apparent confusion of the form (union
grievance/citizen analogue requirement) and subject matter (private vs. public interest/
“pursuant to official duties” requirement) of the employee speech in judicial analysis.
Judging from Pickering and its progeny, there is no dispute that the subject matter of
the employee speech—specifically, whether it addresses a matter of public concern—
is a fundamental part of the First Amendment analysis.151 Indeed, it constitutes the
147. Id.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
150. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25.
151. Prior to Garcetti it was not a part of a status assessment of the speaker (i.e., public employee/private

citizen). In Givhan, for example, Justice Rehnquist announced that “[w]hen a teacher speaks publicly, it is
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first inquiry in a Pickering analysis. What is less clear is whether the form that the
speech takes—for example, a union grievance—is relevant to that analysis at all.
Particularly unclear is whether the form is relevant to the initial assessment of
speaker’s status as a citizen or a public employee, now explicitly required as a separate
inquiry under Garcetti.
Courts addressing the question of public employee speech have taken note of the
form of the speech, but this was generally in the context of examining whether the
employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern.152 In Garcetti, however, the
form of the speech became a significant and determinative factor in the status
assessment of the speaker, and thus ultimately dispositive in the First Amendment
analysis.153 Likewise, the Weintraub court focused on the form of the speech when it
stated that, by filing a grievance with his union, Weintraub “was speaking pursuant
to his official duties.”154 And “because Weintraub made his statements ‘pursuant to’
his official duties as a schoolteacher . . . his speech was not protected.”155 The court
thus never reached the question of whether the subject of Weintraub’s speech
addressed a matter of public concern.156 In other words, for the Second Circuit
engaging in the first step of a Garcetti analysis, it was the form of Weintraub’s speech
generally the content of his statements that must be assessed to determine whether they ‘in any way either
impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or . . . interfered with the
regular operation of the schools generally.’” Givhan v. W. Line Cons. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4
(1979) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968)). Similarly, the First Circuit in
Mercado-Berrios, citing Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010), noted that “[t]he relevant
inquiry under Garcetti . . . has two basic components . . . both of which are highly context-sensitive.”
Mercado-Berrios v. Cancel-Alegria, 611 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149
F.3d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added); see also McCarthy & Eckes, supra note 19, at 232
(stating that “the forum is not dispositive in identifying whether the comments are pursuant to job duties”
and that “lower courts observed that determining whether a public employee’s expression is protected
requires a ‘fact-sensitive, context-specific balancing of competing interests”). But see Stahura-Uhl v.
Iroquois Cent. Sch. Dist., 836 F. Supp. 2d 132 (2011) (holding that special education teacher spoke
pursuant to her official duties when she complained to coworkers and students’ parents about deprivation
of resources for students and could thus not avail herself of First Amendment protection).
152. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569 (letter to the editor); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983)

(internal office questionnaire); Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F. 3d 158, 161
(2d Cir. 2006) (letter to supervisor); Montle v. Westwood Heights Sch. Dist., 437 F. Supp. 2d 652, 653
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (T-shirt with pro-union message).

153. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (asserting that the subject matter of Ceballos’s memo was “nondispositive”).
154. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 201.
155. Id. at 205.
156. In support of this view of the form of speech, the Second Circuit favorably cites Boyce v. Andrew in

which the Eleventh Circuit held that “[t]he form and context in which the [plaintiffs’] complaints were
made are indicative of the fact that they intended to address only matters connected with their jobs.” Id.
at 204 (citing Boyce v. Andrew, 510 F.3d 1333, 1343–44 (11th Cir. 2007)). From this assertion, the
Second Circuit concluded that the “form and context” in which the speech was made in Boyce—an
internal communication to a supervisor—“weighed against First Amendment protection” in that case.
Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 204. In fact, however, the Eleventh Circuit in Boyce focused primarily on the
subject matter of the plaintiffs’ speech in arriving at the conclusion that it was made pursuant to their
official duties. Boyce, 510 F.3d at 1344–46.
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(union grievance), not its subject matter (school safety), which determined that he
had spoken as an employee rather than as a citizen, and thus disqualified his speech
from First Amendment protection. The problem with this analysis is that the union
grievance is a form of speech legally protected by labor law regardless of its subject.157
Therein too lies a logical fallacy of the Second Circuit’s reasoning:
Major Premise:	Employee speech made pursuant to the employee’s
official duties is not protected by the First Amendment.
Minor Premise: Only employees can file union grievances.
Conclusion:	Union grievances constitute speech pursuant to an
employee’s official duties and is unprotected by the
First Amendment.

The first two premises, at least after Garcetti, are valid. To accept the court’s conclusion,
however, is to assume a third premise: employees file union grievances pursuant to
their official duties. But this is false. The Second Circuit nonetheless assumed the
validity of this third premise, without explanation or rationale, which was necessary in
supporting its conclusion. This confusion of form and subject, and especially the
misplaced focus on the form of the speech in the threshold inquiry, renders this First
Amendment analysis critically flawed in connection with the union grievance.158
So ingrained is this analytical confusion, in fact, that even where the courts find
the challenged speech to be protected, they nevertheless seem compelled to conflate
subject and form. In Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, for example,
the court asserted that “[n]early all of the matters Plaintiffs claim they discussed were
made pursuant to their duties as teachers.”159 But a “matter” (i.e., a subject) cannot be
“made” (much less made pursuant to a duty).160
157. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–59 (2006); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 204, 208,

209-a (New York State’s Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act, or “Taylor Law”) (McKinney 2011).
In addition, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 12-306(a)(3) makes it an improper practice for a public
employer or its agents to discriminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or
discouraging membership in, or participation in the activities of, any public employee organization. The
New York City Board of Collective Bargaining has jurisdiction over disputes involving this section of
New York City Administrative Code. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 205(5)(d) (2009).

158. The confusion is not just among the courts. See R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in

Today’s Workplace, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 749, 766 (2011) (“It may be assumed that filing such a union
grievance is indeed part of one’s job, within one’s realistic job description . . . .”). Paul Forster falls into
the typical post-Garcetti trap in Teaching in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching
in Public Schools. Forster conf lates (or at least equates) a teacher’s “official duties” with her “official
teaching duties,” which leads to his analytical confusion of subject and form. See Paul Forster, Teaching
in a Democracy: Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 Gonz. L. Rev. 687,
696 (2011). But see Elzer, supra note 19, at 378 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006)).
Elzer notes that “it is far from ‘clear’ what part of Freitag’s job duties required her to be subjected to
sexual harassment, let alone to report it,” and that “the effect of the [Freitag decision] is to strip all
internal grievances of First Amendment protection, regardless of their truth or importance.”

159. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
160. In other words, one may “make” a complaint, where the act of and/or forum for complaining is “part-

and-parcel” of one’s employment duties, regardless of the subject matter of the complaint. Vice versa: one
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This confusion of form and subject, and especially the misplaced focus on the
form of the speech in the threshold inquiry, renders the First Amendment analysis
centered on the citizen analogue inquiry inapt in connection with the union
grievance.161
One apparent exception is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Dallas
Independent School District, in which a school district discharged an athletic director
after he issued a memorandum asserting the misuse of public school funds.162 While
the Fifth Circuit found this speech unprotected because it was “made in the course of
performing his employment,” the court explained that “[u]nder Garcetti, we must
shift our focus from the content of the speech to the role the speaker occupied when
he said it . . . Ceballos was acting pursuant to his official duties because he was
performing activities required to fulfill his duties.” 163 But the Williams court
distinguished Williams’s situation because the employer conceded “that an Athletic
Director is not required to write memoranda to his principal regarding athletic
accounts.”164 The court asserted that it “must determine the extent to which, under
Garcetti, a public employee is protected by the First Amendment if his speech is not
necessarily required by his job duties but nevertheless is related to his job duties.”165
But the court did not indicate why it must pursue that inquiry, which it explained
was beyond the scope of Garcetti.166
A related manifestation of this confusion is found in the misplaced focus on the
underlying event rather than on the immediately precipitating event. Weintraub was
not retaliated against—indeed, did not claim retaliation—for his failure to maintain
order and discipline in his classroom (the underlying event/fact); he was retaliated
against for filing a grievance (the immediately precipitating event).167 This is sloppy
legal analysis, particularly when the court: (1) offers no rationale for the assertion,
and nevertheless dismisses the plaintiff ’s First Amendment claims; and (2) finds that
may complain where the subject is clearly related—indeed, closely related—to the employee’s duties, but
may utilize a forum (such as a contractual grievance procedure) that nevertheless leaves the “speech”
protected. But one may not “make” a matter, subject, or topic. This is semantically, and by extension
conceptually, flawed.
161. See supra note 158.
162. 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007).
163. Id. at 692–94.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 693. The Williams court articulated one of the more expansive definitions of “official duties” when

it equated “[a]ctivities undertaken in the course of performing one’s job” with “activities pursuant to
official duties.” Id. (citations omitted).

166. Id. at 692.
167. See also Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), in which the court

conf lated the underlying fact (falsification of records) with the immediately precipitating event
(complaint) in erroneously, and conclusorily, holding that the complaint was unprotected speech. In
other words, the Adams court implicitly equated “part-and-parcel of a teacher’s concerns as a teacher”
with that teacher’s “official duties” as a teacher.
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absent a “relevant analogue” to speech by private citizens, public employees speak
pursuant to their official duties, and are thus unprotected by the First Amendment.168
		

1.	Union Grievance: A Form of Speech That Should Never Constitute Speech
“Pursuant to an Official Duty”

This note argues that the filing of a union contract grievance should never be
found to constitute an “official duty” of any public employee and thus should not
preclude First Amendment protection under the first step of the Garcetti test. As
previously noted, this is partly because the filing of a union grievance, in accordance
with a collectively bargained grievance procedure, is protected by state and federal
labor law.169
In Weintraub II, in support of its position that Weintraub’s claims were barred
because his statements were made in his capacity as an employee, the City argued
that “[o]bviously, it is within the job duties of any teacher to maintain discipline
within the classroom, and Weintraub’s referral of the student to Goodman . . . falls
within these duties.”170
But, apropos Weintraub, grievance filing is not—and has never been—part of a
teacher’s official duties.171 Indeed, Judge Calabresi in his Weintraub dissent suggests
that grievance filing is hostile to a school district’s interests and by extension, is at
least arguably hostile to the interests of any public employer.172 Because grievance
filing is not part of a teacher’s official duties, even very broadly defined, it must not
be summarily precluded from First Amendment protection even while it is also
expressly protected under state and federal labor law.173 More broadly, this means
that no adverse employment action should be taken against a public employee for
exercising her right to file a union grievance. “Utilization of the grievance process is
a ‘protected activity,’ and interference with the exercise of that right is an improper
practice.”174 Otherwise the National Labor Relations Act and by extension New
York’s Taylor Law contain meaningless provisions and the determination that the
168. Id. at 428 (quoting Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 203).
169. See discussion supra Part II.B; supra note 157.
170. Weintraub II, 489 F. Supp. 2d 209, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
171. See N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3001 et seq. (McKinney 2011); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §§ 30,

100 et seq. (McKinney 2011). Although teacher duties are not codified in New York State, standard
industry practices, in New York and around the country, have nonetheless emerged over the years.
Teachers prepare for class, teach class, respond to and grade student work, assist students in need, or
desirous, of extra help; they staff committees, supervise student acstivities, etc. With the notable
exception of certain statutory mandated reporting obligations, public school teachers have no civil
obligation to notify their employer of any concerns, malfeasance, grievances or complaints.

172. See Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 209 n.6.
173. See supra text accompanying note 157.
174. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n, Public Sector Labor & Employment Law 293 (1998) (citing Bd. of Educ.

Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 5, Half Hollow Hills, 6 PERB 3034 (1973), aff ’d on other grounds sub. nom.
Frank v. PERB, 384 N.Y.S.2d 705, 9 PERB 7012 (2d Dep’t 1976); see also N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 203,
204, 208, 209-a (2008).
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First Amendment does not protect the filing of union grievances effectively results
in a circumvention of the labor laws which expressly protect such activity. In
Weintraub III, the court could have given effect to both the U.S. Constitution and
New York State law by finding either that filing a union grievance constitutes
protected activity under state law and so Garcetti is inapplicable, or that filing a
union grievance is consistent with the types of speech protected by the First
Amendment.
No court applying the Garcetti test has asserted that the filing of a union
grievance is a legally unprotected activity. In fact, those courts that have addressed
the question at all have typically done so with conclusory pronouncements implying
the self-evidence that such filing is an “official duty.”175 Generally this assertion is
based on the perceived lack of “citizen analogue” to the chosen form of speech. In
Weintraub III for instance, the Second Circuit concluded, without further explanation,
that Weintraub’s filing of a grievance in accordance with his union’s collective
bargaining agreement was part of his official duties176 because the court found that
the grievance “constituted ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns about his ability to
properly perform his duties.’”177
This interpretation seems to imply that, depending on their subject matter, some
union grievances might be considered official duties and others might not. However,
this contradicts the court’s earlier broad assertion incorporating the filing of a
grievance among a teacher’s official duties. Most schoolteachers, presumably, go
through their entire careers without ever filing a contractual union grievance. It is
hard to imagine that most—indeed any—go through their entire careers without
confronting some issue which might be worthy of at least informal complaint. Does
this mean that most work a full career without ever fulfilling their official duties?
Nevertheless, Decotiis significantly narrowed Garcetti, holding that “[i]n
identifying Plaintiff ’s official responsibilities,” the court must focus “on ‘the duties
an employee is actually expected to perform.’”178 Further, the court found that
“[a]lthough no one contextual factor is dispositive . . . several non-exclusive factors . . .
are instructive” in conducting this analysis.179 Among those the court cited
175. See, e.g., Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480

F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007); Phillips v. City of Dawsonville, 499 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2007);
Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2006).

176. Weintraub III, 593 F.3d at 202.
177. Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Weintraub III, 593

F.3d at 203).

178. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,

424–25 (2006)).

179. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32–33 (citing Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 7–8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2010);

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–21, 423; Williams, 480 F.3d at 694; Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter
Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007)). “Applying these factors,” the court found that the
plaintiff ’s “speech may have been related to the subject matter of her job, but it was not, strictly speaking,
among her enumerated duties to make such speech,” and thus found for the employee-plaintiff on the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32–33.
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whether the employee was commissioned or paid to make the speech in
question; the subject matter of the speech; whether the speech was made up
the chain of command; whether the employee spoke at her place of
employment; whether the speech gave objective observers the impression that
the employee represented the employer when she spoke (lending it “official
significance”); whether the employee’s speech derived from special knowledge
obtained during the course of her employment; and whether there is a
so-called citizen analogue to the speech.180

While the Decotiis saga may not be over yet, in some courts there are workplace
speech claims that are surviving a Garcetti analysis.181 Other courts, however, have
held that an employee’s unsupported assertions that a particular function was not
among her official duties were not dispositive. In Adams v. New York State Education
Department, for example, a teacher’s complaints about school conditions and practices
led to retaliation.182 In response to the teacher’s claims of a First Amendment
violation, the district court found the teacher’s “conclusory statements that making
the complaints in question did not fall within the scope of their job descriptions does
not end the inquiry.”183 In ruling against the plaintiffs, the court relied on the “clear
instructions” provided by Garcetti and Weintraub.184
D. A Modest Proposal for a Return to Reason: Montle v. Westwood Heights

In his dissent in Weintraub III, Judge Calabresi notes that “Garcetti leaves open the
definition of ‘pursuant to official duties.’”185 Notwithstanding that Garcetti is inapposite
in a First Amendment analysis where the speech in question took the form of a union
grievance, that opening should be filled with an unambiguous definition and
corresponding standard of “pursuant to official duties” that the courts may apply
consistently and on which employers and employees may rely. The U.S. District Court
180. Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32
181. See, e.g., Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (discussing “ordinary duties”

versus “official duties”); Day v. Borough of Carlisle, 1: CV-04-1040, 2006 WL 1892711 (M.D. Pa. July
10, 2006) (plaintiff alleging no duty to report); Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C02-04975 MHP, 2006
WL 1980401 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (showing evidence of culture of not reporting prevailed over
employer’s assertion of duty to report).

182. 752 F. Supp. 2d 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
183. Id. at 427.
184. Id. It is worth noting that the court found “[t]his guidance” to be “relevant in the Court’s evaluation

pursuant to the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility rule to test the sufficiency of a cause of action alleging
unlawful retaliation under the First Amendment.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Following a similar analysis, the Seventh Circuit
in Trigillo v. Snyder found dispositive the fact that Trigillo’s speech was “written on department
letterhead and signed by her as ‘Chief of Procurement.’” Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir.
2008). Based upon these factors, the court found that Trigillo’s speech had been made pursuant to her
official duties. Under this test as well, the filing of a union grievance cannot be deemed an official duty.
See id. These cases would seem to suggest that the question of the scope of “official duties” is one of fact,
not law, although the Supreme Court in Garcetti never reached that question.

185. Adams v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 752 F. Supp. 2d 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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for the Eastern District of Michigan provided a step in the right direction in Montle
v. Westwood Heights School District,186 issued just two weeks after Garcetti.
In Montle, a probationary teacher claimed her termination was in retaliation for,
among other things, her coming to work in a t-shirt containing a pro-union slogan.187
The teacher claimed First Amendment protection, and the district court conducted
what was essentially a Pickering analysis. First, the court considered whether Montle
was speaking on a matter of public concern; second, it weighed Montle’s interest in
commenting on a matter of public concern against the school district’s interest in
promoting efficient operation of its business;188 and third, it determined whether
Montle’s t-shirt message was a “substantial or motivating factor” in her termination.189
By not engaging in an initial determination of the speaker’s status, and by not first
looking for a citizen analogue, the court clearly did not follow Garcetti, a case it
nevertheless cites favorably.190
This (relatively) quiet act of (relatively benign) judicial defiance may be a harbinger
of a potential return to reason in public workplace speech jurisprudence. A doctrinal
test that disregards the status question of whether the employee was speaking as a
private citizen or as a public employee—recognizing that this distinction is irrelevant
to the interests of both the public and the public employer—but which instead begins
by asking whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern sufficiently great as
to render the employer’s interest in undisturbed operation of his business secondary is
sound and rational. As Montle demonstrates, it is also workable. If the employee’s
speech passes that initial threshold test of whether it addressed a matter of public
concern, the court should engage in a balancing of competing interests between
government and citizen. As part of this analysis, the court would ask whether the
employee chose a reasonable form and forum for her speech. If she did, then the speech
is protected under the First Amendment. If not, then the court might engage in a
totality of the circumstances analysis, with burden of proof shifting between parties.
As a matter of law, a union contract grievance filed by a public employee would
always satisfy the second prong of this test.191 It constitutes a separate and unique
category of speech that requires a different analysis because, as discussed in Part II
above, it is mutually negotiated—thus, by definition, is acceptable to both employer
and employee—and is protected by statute.192
186. 437 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
187. Id. at 653.
188. Relevant to this analysis was the degree of “disharmony” Montle’s speech case in the workplace. Id at 656.
189. Id. at 654–56.
190. In the end, the district court sustained the termination. Id. at 656.
191. On a related note, the National Labor Relations Board recently extended protection to work-related

speech on online social network sites. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Says Rights Apply on Net, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 2010, at B1.

192. See 2-6 Educ. Law § 613 (Matthew Bender, LEXIS 2010). Because of the constitutionally protected

rights of association, employees may be dismissed for union membership, participation or activity only
if the employing board can demonstrate a compelling state interest to be served. Greminger v. Seaborne,
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Such a test would appropriately emphasize the form of the speech over its content
in the balancing of competing interests and would not require a citizen analogue. For
instance, an internal union grievance filed with a supervisor is, in and of itself,
unlikely to cause any disruption at all to the employer’s operation, whereas a
newspaper editorial is much more likely to be highly disruptive.
V. CONCLUSION

In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pickering announced a two-part test for
determining what workplace speech enjoys First Amendment protection and what
speech does not. The Pickering balancing test was applied by the courts without
significant modification for nearly forty years. In 2006, the Garcetti Court modified
that analysis when it introduced a threshold “status” inquiry—whether the speaker was
speaking as a citizen or an employee at the time of the speech—as a precondition to
applying the Pickering balancing test. The calculus employed by the Court in engaging
in that status inquiry involves a determination as to whether there exists a “citizen
analogue” to the employee’s speech. The Court in Garcetti arrived at that calculus by
focusing, for the first time, on the “citizen” element of Pickering’s “as a citizen on a
matter of public concern” test. From Pickering until Garcetti, the courts had always
focused on the “matter of public concern” element. The Garcetti Court noted that the
“citizen” analysis focuses on the “official duties” the employee is required to perform.
In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Weintraub III further
modified the evolving workplace speech jurisprudence when it found that the filing of
union contract grievance is an official duty of a public school teacher.
This note argued that the Second Circuit’s holding is unsupported. The filing of a
union grievance is a speech act that is protected by federal, state, and local labor laws.
It is a right held by the public employee to be exercised—or not—only at that employee’s
discretion and is a communication not for the employer, but to the employee on the
employee’s own behalf. An employee cannot be compelled to file a grievance, even if
doing so would be the only means of challenging a perceived wrong in the workplace.
The filing of a grievance, therefore, cannot be seen as an employee’s official duty.
Moreover, the Court’s focus on the form of the speech (union grievance and its citizen
analogue) rather than on its subject (school safety in Weintraub and matters of public
concern more broadly) irrationally places the interests of the public employer ahead of
the interests of the members of the public it serves. Finally, permitting employer
imposition of discipline or retaliation when a public employee engages in such speech,
under the rationale that such speech is not protected by the First Amendment,
effectively eviscerates those federal, state, and local labor laws.193
584 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1978). The state’s interest generally becomes compelling only when the employee’s
activities are disruptive and impede either the employee’s own performance or the normal operations of
the educational institution. McGill v. Bd. of Educ., 602 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1979); Yuen v. Bd. of Educ.,
77 Ill. App. 2d 353 (1966).
193. This is arguably so notwithstanding the fact that the employee-plaintiff, like David Weintraub, for

example, may have brought the wrong legal claim in the wrong forum. That is, had Weintraub brought
a claim of Taylor Law violation to the New York Public Employment Relations Board, he likely would
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In the end, the current workplace speech jurisprudence unreasonably includes within
Garcetti’s broad reach the union contract grievance. This unnecessarily privileges the
public employer’s right to efficient operation of services above the public employee’s
right to speak out about workplace issues, as well as the public’s right to important,
often otherwise unavailable, information concerning its safety and welfare. As more
recent case law demonstrates, all three categories of rights may be protected without
significant sacrifice. The first step toward that goal would be to allow First Amendment
protection to workplace speech in the form of a union grievance that addresses a matter
of public concern, regardless of the form in which that speech is made.

have emerged victorious, as the City of New York essentially conceded in its initial brief. Defendant’s
Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.,
593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2005) (No. 00-CV-4384), 2005 WL 3499475 at *8–9.
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